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Abstract 
This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of 
the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist 
Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists 
and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist 
parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the 
state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate 
consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are 
conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the 
possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from 
quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over 
national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist 
Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a 
consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded 
statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional 
dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations 
between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab 
uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international 
dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, 
and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (e.g. Tunisia) and for 
worse (e.g. Egypt). 
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Introduction: Islamism, the state and socio-historical changes  
For a brief moment during the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamism seemed to have 
become somewhat irrelevant. A year later, with the electoral gains made by 
many Islamists movements in the newly democratic atmosphere that then 
characterized the region, they appeared to be back on top of (and dictating) the 
political agenda. At the time of writing (early 2015), the wheel has turned again 
and neither democratic- nor Islamist-oriented institutional evolutions seem to be 
making headway.  
A large (perhaps the largest) part of the apparent difficulty in delineating the 
Islamist factor relates to identifying and explaining political Islam/Islamism. 
Whatever Islamism may be—and the perspectives that we will be proposing in 
the following are analytical distinctions, not the ‘real face’ of Islamism—the 
generic representations of the phenomenon that tend to dominate the political 
debate are commonly formatted to fit pre-existing explanations of political and 
institutional behaviour.1 Beyond pointing out that political Islam has many 
faces,2 we contend that making analytical distinctions within political Islam to 
reflect broader path dependencies is crucial to understanding the role, and fate, 
of Islamism during and after the Arab uprisings. Specifically, the many faces of 
Islamism reflect the different models of state governance that have 
predominated in the Middle East region (and beyond) over the years. This is 
particularly the case for those Islamists that we categorise as ‘statist’ to 
emphasise the close connection between national structures of governance and 
the strategies of activists in their particular socio-cultural and socio-economic 
circumstances. It is those statist Islamists that have, due to their aspirations to 
acquire state power, been most obviously affected by regime change, reform, or 
hardening during the Arab uprisings.  
But Islamism is evidently not always best defined by its relationship with the 
state. For ‘non-statist’ Islamists, the uprisings and their aftermath hold a 
different significance, even though they too are affected by the changes in the 
relationship between the state and statist Islamists. We distinguish non-statist 
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Islamists by the primacy they accord to their relationship to the community 
instead of the state. This very broad category includes quietist grassroots 
movements inspired by salafism as well as violent transnational jihadi 
organizations, although important distinctions exist between them. Whether 
they seek to avoid politics altogether or have a vision of a political community 
not bound to the modern nation state, these groups compete with statist 
Islamists for the Islamic high ground, thereby indirectly shaping national 
political landscapes. Crucially, these modalities of Islamist activism do not 
always correspond neatly to divisions between groups but can coexist within the 
same organization: the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has strong statist and 
non-statist orientations, although the former commonly structures the latter. 
Conversely, following the Arab uprisings, traditionally non-statist salafi 
formations engaged in state-level politics (most notably the Egyptian Nour 
Party).  
In the following, we present an analytical perspective on the evolution of the 
relationship between Islamists and the state grounded on this distinction 
between two path-dependent configurations of contemporary Islamism. In 
section 2 below, we discuss how forms of governance and developmentalism 
influenced political Islam in the preceding decades. Then in section 3 we focus 
more specifically on the dynamics of statist Islamism in the context of these 
political evolutions before, during and since the Arab uprisings. Section 4 follows 
the same approach to elucidate non-statist modalities of Islamist activism. In 
section 5 we offer some explanations for the differential outcomes, particularly 
between Egypt and Tunisia, in the wake of the uprisings.  
 
 
 
Islamism and evolving models of governance and development 
Seen from the vantage point of the politics of the nation-state, the evolution 
and diversification of Islamism reflects trajectories of state formation and socio-
economic development in the Middle East and the rest of the developing world. 
In 1960s and 1970s debates dominated by modernization theory and class 
analysis, Islamism hardly featured in political analyses of Middle Eastern and 
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other Muslim-majority developing countries. When it was considered, it tended 
to be dismissed as a rear-guard battle from traditional social forces heading for 
the dustbin of history.3 State-builders focussed on developing strong institutions 
and a modern socio-economic system, generally inspired by liberal or socialist 
models. The modernist and authoritarian-populist Nasser regime had crushed 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, by then the leading Islamist movement in the 
region, in the second half of the 1950s.  But the Nasserite model, widely assumed 
to exemplify the shape of things to come in the region, lasted barely a couple of 
decades. By the mid-1970s, Arab-socialism was falling apart in most of the 
region, while ‘anachronistic’ regimes such as those of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States were beginning to promote a rather different developmental pathway 
allying economic modernism with patrimonial rule and religious legitimation 
strategies.  
In the 1980s, in the wake of the Iranian revolution, Islamism was deemed to 
be concerned primarily with the establishment of an ‘Islamic state’. It was 
viewed, in part, as a kind of nationalist and revolutionist movement seeking to 
capture the institutions of the state to implement top-down its preferred new 
social order, just like other such movements from the left and the right had done 
previously throughout the region. In practice, the growing autonomy and 
internal fracturing of Islamist movements in the 1980s owed much to the Islamic 
revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood mostly applauded the revolution and saw it 
as evidence that Islamism could succeed in taking state power.4 Salafis, on the 
other hand, opposed it on principle and condemned Khomeinism on sectarian 
grounds. Arab regimes were able to withstand the challenge, in part because of 
their coercive resources, and in part because the mainstream Islamist 
movements at the time calculated that they lacked the societal base to launch an 
Iranian-style revolution.5 The failure of the jihad in Egypt to launch a large-scale 
popular insurrection in the wake of President Sadat’s assassination in 1981 
suggested to many Islamist activists that Arab societies were not ready for an 
Islamic revolution. When revolutionary Islamism failed by and large to be 
replicated outside Iran, the challenge to the state posed by political Islam was 
deemed by some scholars to have failed.  
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With the increasingly evident failure of state modernism and 
developmentalism, and the growing influence of the Saudi model, dependent on 
oil rents, Arab states entered a phase of ‘post-populism’.6 This was reinforced in 
the 1980s and 1990s by the spread of neo-liberalism to the region under 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund. Post-populism represented a 
means whereby authoritarian regimes could strengthen themselves even as they 
abandoned the old populist social contract, by diversify their constituencies and 
diluting potential political opposition from civil society. This entailed 
combinations of increased dependence on external sources of revenue (or 
‘rents’), limited political opening, and some ‘outsourcing’ of governance to non-
state actors such as Islamist charities.  From the perspective of regimes, Islamism 
also served the broader purposes of neoliberal reform to the extent that it 
fostered self-help strategies on the part of local populations, providing not only 
spiritual services, but also educational, medical and financial support. 
The post-populist turn towards neoliberalism created new domestic 
environments for social and political activism. Islamist movements made 
headway in society because they proposed a model of religious solidarity that 
responded, and adapted, to the downscaling of the role of the state throughout 
the region. As democratizing discourse entered the region after 1990 some 
Islamists movements portrayed their new involvement in electoral politics as a 
means of nurturing a ‘good’ Muslim society (and as such an endeavour which 
could be intellectually reconciled with their ideological emphasis on God’s 
sovereignty).  
In parallel, however, post-populist regimes adopted more sophisticated 
versions of “divide and rule” by which they sought to control rising Islamism, 
particularly through provoking or exploiting “culture wars’7 between Islamist 
and secular actors. Absent the interest aggregation and mediation function of 
democracy, competition in civil and political society was played out on the 
terrain of morality and identity, with the cultural sphere (that is influence over 
education, media and cultural production) being the only one to which 
authoritarian regimes devolved any substantial power. This had the effect of 
depoliticising public discourse as a whole in many Middle Eastern countries and 
strengthening movements, like Islamism, that prioritized culture and identity.8  
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The ‘culture wars’ waged by Islamist activists against secular civil society, 
and vice versa, militated against unified oppositions to regimes in many Arab 
states. The Islamist movement itself was divided along many lines from the 
1980s, including between those that favoured accommodation with the regime 
and participation in pseudo-democratic politics (the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist parties), those that sought disengagement from state-level politics 
altogether (salafis) and those who sought to imposed their vision of an Islamic 
order via the violent overthrow of the existing social and political system 
(jihadists).9 Within each of these categories, furthermore, differences over 
strategy existed. Nevertheless, during the 1990s Islamism grew to constitute the 
principal (if not sole) viable alternative to secular authoritarianism in much of 
the region, a reality that was emphasized but not invented by regimes that 
sought to frighten the western democracies into keeping them in power.  
After 11 September 2001, analyses inspired by the ‘war on terror’ tended to 
categorize Islamist movements primarily in relation to their use of violent 
rhetoric or practices, overlooking the different articulations and trajectories of 
Islamism.10 However, as Francois Burgat indicates, over-emphasis on one type of 
violent Islamism overshadowed other forms of Islamist activism. 11  Using 
violence as the main distinction among Islamic movements obscures important 
structural similarities and overlaps between jihadi and salafi groups, in 
particular their shared ambivalence toward state-level politics and attempt to 
operate beyond or in defiance of the state. Shifts in state-society relations did not 
affect them in the same way as they did those Islamists that sought state power. 
The focus on Islamist violence parallel to the increased focus of the international 
community on ‘hard’ security issues was matched by a ‘hardening’ of the Middle 
Eastern states and a political discourse dominated by securitization. Keen to tap 
into the external support offered under the rubric of the ‘war on terror’, regimes 
cracked down on violent and non-violent Islamist opposition alike.  
The 2011 Arab uprisings marked another re-articulation of the relationship 
between the state and Islamism. The process of regional ‘state weakening’, which 
arguably began with the external shock of the US invasion of Iraq and toppling of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003,12 continued with regime changes in Libya and Yemen, 
as well as the civil war in Syria. The weakening of state power in all these cases 
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vastly increased the salience of non-statist salafi and jihadi movements. In Egypt 
and Tunisia, the Arab uprisings fundamentally challenged the ‘cronyistic’ 
development strategies pursued by the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes. In neither 
case, however, did the Islamist beneficiaries of these uprisings offer compelling 
alternatives to this economic model. Ennahda in Tunisia—and the political class 
as a whole—remained vulnerable to bottom-up pressure from the marginalized 
(‘muhammishin’), who looked to salafism as a more promising vehicle for social 
inclusion.13 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was pushed aside by the military 
after a lacklustre year in power which, if it did not disprove the claim that ‘Islam 
is the solution’, cast doubt on the capacity of Islamism’s oldest movement to 
implement it. Political discourse there reverted to familiar ‘war on terror’ 
territory, as the state relied more than ever on virtually unchecked coercive 
power to deal with the ‘Islamist threat’.  
 
Islamist Variations 
In the following section, we track the evolution of statist and non-statist Islamist 
activism in the region in light of changing state dynamics. We do not claim that 
these trends encapsulate the entire complexity of contemporary Islamic activism 
or that the substantive differences we identify will necessarily retain their 
significance for all time. Our orientation toward national state institutions as our 
focal point is a heuristic devise enabling us to map the contemporary patterns of 
interaction between Middle East regimes and Islamist activism and understand 
how specific trajectories of state and Islamist governance can come together to 
either strengthen or weaken a polity.  
 
Statist Islamism  
For some scholars ‘political Islam’ refers to those groups and movements 
that actively engage with the state and national-level politics, unlike 
‘fundamentalism’, which eschews formal politics and focuses on the social 
sphere.14 Recognizing that ‘the political’ extends deeper than the state level, and 
also acknowledging the well-established conceptual problems with the term 
‘fundamentalism’,15 we use the term ‘statist Islamism’ to refer to institutionalized 
participation in the politics of the nation state. This variant of Islamism is 
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exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood, although it has outgrown the 
Brotherhood as an organisation. The model of political action and the ideological 
programme elaborated by Hasan al-Banna, and more recently by Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, Rached Ghannouchi and others, have been highly influential and 
embraced and adapted across the Middle East: actors like Ennahda in Tunisia, 
the Saudi ‘Sahwa’ movement, or Islah in Yemen, have Brotherhood roots or links. 
Ideologically, this current has come closest to reconciling Islamic doctrines, and 
the sharia as the source of all legislation, with liberal forms of democracy. 
Socially, it has grown within the middle classes in the Arab world and is 
intrinsically connected with the expansion of education, urbanisation, and other 
facets of ‘development’ in the region over the course of the 20th century.16  
In the main, statist Islamists have not been revolutionaries in the sense of 
seeking to overturn the existing social order. Their Islamism, rather, evolved as a 
reformist discourse through which often lower-middle class activists could 
connect with a broader popular constituency and challenge the claims of the 
(usually more secularized) establishment to speak for the nation. They also 
appealed to the aspirations and fears of dissatisfied middle classes, which, 
generally speaking, sought the improvement, rather than destruction, of existing 
systems. Islamism’s claims were thus advanced not on the basis of challenging 
social hierarchies or the economic model, but in terms of an attack on 
corruption, moral laxity and neglect of religion, all of which, in their view, 
produced the socio-economic ills of the community. The economic problems 
were to be solved not by a drastically new system of governance or 
redistribution of wealth but by elites’ recognising and acting upon their 
obligations to Islam and sharia. 
Statist Islamism evolved in line with shifts in models of state governance 
and, concomitantly, forms of societal activism. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
and elsewhere, had often been ‘moderate’ to the extent it was willing—where 
permitted—to work within existing systems and broadly accepted the centrality 
of the nation-state as the locus of political identity.17 Hasan al-Banna had 
rejected party politics as divisive and elitist, in line with the rest of the 
nationalist movement in Egypt at the time. Brotherhood intellectuals such as 
Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad al-Ghazzali supported nationalisation and 
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developed ideas reconciling socialism with Islam in ways that reflected and 
helped inform the official ideology that was Nasserism. Following the limited 
political opening under Sadat more ‘liberal’ democratic ideas and practices were 
incorporated into the movement—in contrast to other components of the 
resurgent Islamist movement that shunned or confronted the state. 
‘Moderation’ was a growing trend among Islamist groups through the 1980s 
and 1990s. This corresponded to a time of partial political liberalization across 
the region. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood entered elections for the first time 
in 1984. In Algeria, the sudden and ill-structured political liberalization of the 
late 1980s enable the Islamic Salvation Front to mobilize voters and to become 
the leading political party of the ill-fated Algerian democratic transition (which 
ended in the 1992 military coup). In Tunisia, Ennahda slowly made gains 
throughout the 1980s during periods of political liberalization that culminated in 
their participation to the 1989 parliamentary elections; a short-lived opening 
that would prove inconsequential as President Ben Ali entrenched his power by 
closing down the political field in the ensuing years. In Jordan, the local branch of 
the Muslim brotherhood would eventually gain the approval of the monarchy to 
form a political party, the Islamic Action Front, in 1992. In Morocco, faced with 
the unwillingness of the main Islamist movement of the country al-Adl wa-
Ihsane to formally recognize a monarchic system of governance, the Moroccan 
King, Hassan II, facilitated the entry into politics of another Islamist formation in 
1996. This party, which would later become the Party of Justice and 
Development, was allowed to participate in formal politics because it was willing 
to recognize the legitimacy of the monarchy.   
Over time, the possibility of aggregating demands for political inclusion 
increased as those movements ‘moderated’ their ideological programmes as a 
result of political learning and strategic adaptation to a partially free political 
environment.18 In the three decades or so prior to the Arab uprisings, Islamist 
groups had softened core ideological goals (such as the establishment of an 
Islamic state) and instead embraced norms related to human rights and 
democracy. There was, however, a ‘ceiling’ beyond which Islamist movements 
would not moderate. 19  Although the high-profile activities of Muslim 
Brotherhood parliamentarians and the ideological innovations of ‘New 
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Islamists’20 contrasted markedly with the image of Islamism as a revolutionary, 
counter-system, force, this wasatiyya, or centrist, trend was by no means 
dominant within Islamism as a whole.  Not only was it contested from within the 
Brotherhood and like-minded groups, producing internal tensions and schisms, 
but it was also rejected outright by grassroots movements, most notably salafis. 
The non-statist trends inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood thus 
structured, to a great extent, the political horizons of the statist ones. 
Nonetheless, ideological and behavioural moderation enabled Islamists to sell 
their programmes to more secular-leaning constituencies as well as to a 
sceptical, if not Islamophobic, outside world.  
 
Non-statist Islamism 
Non-statist Islamism is not so much ‘apolitical’ as it is ‘infra-political’--local-level 
organisational, preaching and charitable activity. Grassroots activism is central 
to political Islam as a whole, as local networks help to structure support for, and 
seek to constitute, an Islamic society. While da’wa (proselytising) has taken 
many forms over time, contemporary grassroots Islamism tends toward a 
conservative interpretation of the ‘fundamentals’ of Islam—a trend most evident 
in salafism. Islamist parties across the region have tended to emerge from and 
link with networks of charitable associations and other grassroots institutions. 
 Salafism, which may be the most important grassroots Islamist 
phenomenon of recent decades, encourages a focus on the community rather 
than the state. Although it tends to be ultra-conservative, with an ideal society 
inspired by teachings and practices from the time of the prophet, salafis’ 
articulation with traditional Muslim customs is not as straightforward as it might 
seem. The ease with which salafi actors can find their public in Muslim 
communities depends on their ability to insert their theological approach into 
the pre-existing religious practices of the local community.21 
 The ability and willingness of the state to cater for marginal groups 
diminished considerably from the late 1970s in the context of economic 
restructuring. As populist-authoritarian regimes metamorphosed into post-
populist ones, large sections of society were forced to rely on self-help strategies, 
kinship networks and other ‘informal’ mechanisms to compensate for exclusion 
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at the national level. Grassroots Islamism operated alongside, or sometimes in 
place of, such existing support mechanisms. Salafis tend to promote an ascetic 
lifestyle and consider consumerism to be a distraction from religious duties. 
Such perspectives appeal to disenfranchised youth for whom consumerism may 
not be an available option.  
Salafi and jihadi movements across the region are also directly influenced by 
political changes initiated at regime level. Salafis’ avoidance of formal political 
engagement has benefited them at the grassroots level, sometimes with the 
approval of the state authorities. Indeed, salafis have benefited from the 
intolerance of regimes towards statist Islamists and jihadists. Although salafis 
have not completely escaped state repression, particularly post-9/11, because 
states have finite resources at their disposal, regimes have tended to concentrate 
their repressive strategies on politicized and armed Islamists. In allowing or 
facilitating the expansion of Islamist grassroots infrastructure, regimes signalled 
their limited capacity to govern peripheral, rural or ‘informal’ urban areas. This 
has left by default, and sometimes by design, the social field more open for 
salafis. Many regimes have sought to channel activists from politically active and 
militant Islamism toward a less overtly threatening salafism. In Egypt, the 
contemporary salafi movement originated (like the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
jihadis) in the student movement of the 1970s, and developed as a ‘safe’ 
alternative to these two movements through the 1990s.22 In Algeria, after the 
banning of the Islamic Salvation Front and the armed confrontation with Islamist 
guerrillas in the 1990s, the military-backed regime was content with the growth 
of salafism as an alternative to both political and armed activism.23 Yet, even if 
many grassroots activists, for principled or pragmatic reasons, eschew politics, 
their activism has played a role as part of a broader Islamist movement in 
building constituencies for Islamist parties.24  
So called jihadis, advocates of the establishment of an Islamic order through 
the use of violence, have been a persistent trend in Arab politics in recent 
decades. Typically they endorse jihad in furtherance of an idealized Islamic 
community on ideological/theological grounds, although some also turn to 
violence in response to the attempts by the state to repress other forms of 
Islamic activism, which, as highlighted by Hafez, make armed struggle a 
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meaningful strategic choice for these organizations.25  Even if leaders of jihadist 
groups may come from relatively well-off backgrounds (with Usama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri being good cases in point), violent activism commonly 
takes place among marginalized or dislocated communities. Jihadis generally 
emphasise a warrior ethos that shuns material possessions and rewards. They 
emerge particularly where the authority and legitimacy of the state are 
contested, absent or have been undermined and generally represent by-products 
of uneven, stalled, or indeed reversed, processes of state formation, as well as of 
the transnational flows of ideas and people encouraged by globalisation.   
 Jihadi movements of the 1980s and 1990s generally failed to capture state 
power due to the superior military capabilities of the incumbent authoritarian 
regimes – viz. the Algerian civil conflict of the 1990s – as well as their inability to 
mobilize large constituencies favouring radical change. As the security 
capabilities of Arab regimes increased, national-based Islamist guerrilla 
movements increasingly turned toward more transnational forms of action to 
compensate for a lack of domestic success.26 The trajectory of the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) in Algeria, which reinvented itself as the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat, and finally as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
illustrates well this trend.  Overall, jihadi failures in the face of coercive states 
have led to the concentration of violent Islamism in places where central 
coercive power is weak. The migration of Al Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula 
(AQAP) from Saudi Arabia to Yemen is one example. The further weakening of 
state power in Yemen, as well as in Libya, Syria, and Iraq has correspondingly 
opened up opportunities for renewed violent activism in these countries.  
   
 
 
Islamism following regime change: explaining differential outcomes 
In seeking to understand Islamism’s ongoing relationship with the state, it is 
important not to focus solely on the impact of ‘regime change’ (or failure, or 
resilience). Beyond the immediate significance of regime change or revolutions, 
the uprisings opened up new possibilities in the general evolution of the state 
structure and mode of governance across the region. It is more useful to view the 
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transformations in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen—as well as 
Syria, Iraq, Morocco and other countries where regimes remained in place—as 
part of a continuum of political change that impacted the short and medium 
terms prospects of Islamism.  
 
Statist Islam and the Uprisings 
Statist Islamism can, generally speaking, claim credit for the expansion of the 
political sphere in the Arab world, as a potential driver of democratization. In 
some cases, Islamists showed themselves to be highly adept at building 
structures of mass inclusion in authoritarian settings in which elite circulation 
was absent (Egypt). In others, this political effort could only take place after the 
fall of authoritarianism (Tunisia).  
 The uprisings of 2011 directly challenged the legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes. They also challenged statist Islamism. They were able to mobilise 
significant numbers of people around slogans not related to religion or identity, 
something that struck at the heart of the ‘culture wars’ framework that had 
served to neutralise dissent for decades. Hopes were high that societal unity 
would carry the day. In mobilising on political and economic issues directly 
(bread, justice, freedom) protesters challenged all parties, but especially 
Islamists, to explicitly link their culture and identity claims to concrete plans for 
political and economic renewal. While statist Islamists can build political parties 
with substantial popular appeal, these dynamics are only supportive of 
democratization processes when they become institutionalized. Beyond the 
revolutionary moment of 2011 the challenge for the countries of the Arab 
uprisings is to institutionalize both the increased level of elites’ circulation and 
the increased level of mass inclusion resulting from the revolution in order to 
make them sustainable in the longer term.  
 What the experiences of the Arab uprisings illustrate is that outcomes 
were as much the result of the choices made during and in the aftermath of the 
uprisings as they were of longer term path dependencies. Islamists faced key 
challenges in using the new opportunities to establish their presence in the post-
uprisings political space. First, statist Islamism was diversifying, and particularly 
in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood no longer had the political field to itself. Due in 
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part to the process of estrangement that had taken place within the Islamist 
firmament from the 1980s, however, the new engagement did not take place in a 
way that coherently linked statist and grassroots challenges together. What has 
been termed ‘political’ or ‘democratic’ salafism, as embodied by Egypt’s Nour 
Party, was shunned by many within the broader salafi sphere.27 This contributed 
to the intra-salafi fracturing that became apparent following the ouster of 
President Morsi into those in the statist sphere that continued to support Morsi 
as a legitimate leader and those that endorsed the military takeover (or who 
chose to leave the national politics once more). Secondly, Islamists also struggled 
to win the support of protest movements that saw them as ‘hijackers’ of the 
revolutions—a factor encouraged both by the evident deal-making that was 
occurring between the old regimes and Islamists (particularly in Egypt and 
Yemen) as well as by many Islamists’ ‘accommodationist’ track records. The 
longstanding antipathy between Islamist and secular actors (part of 
authoritarian divide and rule strategies) outlasted the overthrow of dictators. At 
the same time, statist Islamists struggled to consolidate and expand grassroots 
support for a political path fraught with compromises that seemed to fly in the 
face of long-cherished Islamist values. The contrasts between Egypt and Tunisia 
illustrate some of the principal factors that determined whether statist Islamists 
could effectively use the opportunity provided by the uprisings. 
Egypt: While the fall of the Mubarak regime opened the door to a 
reconfigured political sphere, the political class as a whole (Islamist and non-
Islamist) failed in the crucial transition period—due to a range of domestic and 
international factors—to realise a constitutional framework that would 
guarantee elite circulation. The Egyptian case is indicative of the vicious circle 
that a struggle for power at the top of the state, and legacies of authoritarian rule 
that precluded cooperation in civil society, can create. The actions of the statist 
Islamists (especially Muslim Brotherhood), of the military institution and of the 
elites from the former regime (particularly in the judiciary) prevented the 
routinisation of multiparty and electoral politics.  
For one, the contending political actors failed sufficiently to bridge the 
numerous divides that had segmented Egyptian politics over the previous 
decades. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood commanded a substantial 
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following, as evidenced by the electoral performance of its political offshoot, the 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Morsi’s (albeit narrow) victory, it failed to 
translate this support into deal-making on a constitutional framework. On the 
one hand, owing to legacies of mistrust from the Mubarak period, the 
Brotherhood and most other Islamist forces were unable to sustain an alliance 
with secular political parties or the revolutionary youth. On the other, despite 
early attempts to demonstrate its willingness to work with the existing coercive 
structures of the state (as represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces), the Brotherhood failed to convince the military and security apparatus 
that it was a reliable political partner.  
The inability of the contending political forces to find mutually acceptable 
‘rules of the game’ meant that growing popular opposition to Brotherhood rule 
did not spur further democratisation and was instead directed toward the 
‘exceptional’ measure of a military coup in the absence of working 
institutionalized processes to mediate between contending interests. The high 
level of mass inclusion that occurred during the uprisings was then temporarily 
institutionalized via a ‘neo-populism’ centring on the personality cult of Abd al-
Fatah al-Sisi and the prestige of the military,28 rather than being linked to the 
principle of a rotation of elites. The resurgent military regime in Egypt has 
destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to connect with its constituencies 
and hence function as a vehicle for inclusion—even a parallel one—as it had in 
the past. The Brotherhood has weathered repression from the regime before, but 
as Saad Eddine Ibrahim recently pointed out, the 30 June ‘Revolution’ that 
precipitated a military coup four days later was the first time the Brotherhood 
had faced a mass popular rebellion. 29  The sheer scale of this uprising, 
exaggerated as it may have been, seriously damaged the Brotherhood’s image as 
a popular movement in the region and hence as a conduit for democratisation. 
The new Sisi regime in Egypt has its founding solidly grounded in a myth of 
popular sovereignty represented by the popular uprising of 30 June. Large 
numbers of secular intellectuals support the eradication of the Muslim 
Brotherhood even if they do not support the retrenchment of military-led 
authoritarianism in Egypt. In this respect, the Egyptian trajectory can be 
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presented as a case of tentative return to the old culture wars encouraged by the 
new military regime.  
Islamists were not mainstreamed as conservative parties in an institutional 
framework that guaranteed a regular rotation of political elites and Islamism’s 
capacity to act as a vehicle for mass inclusion was so undermined that even if 
some form of elite circulation is established it will likely assume a ‘decorative’ 
form (façade democracy, pseudo-democracy), lacking a meaningful democratic 
connection with the electorate. The potential of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
political Salafis to become handmaidens of democratisation was lost.  
Tunisia: A democratizing Arab state can be seen as a direct institutional 
outcome of the 2011 Arab uprisings in only one case, that of Tunisia. Rather than 
facilitating a return to authoritarian rule (either directly by taking advantage of 
their political success or indirectly by inciting their opponents to grab power for 
themselves) or undermining the capabilities of the state institutions, the 
Islamists of Ennahda contributed to the stability of the post-revolutionary 
democratic institutions and practices. The normalization of statist Islamism is 
tightly imbricated into the process of consolidation of multiparty democracy in 
the country.  
As significant as the actual revolutionary uprising and foundational elections 
of 2011 were the processes of democratic consolidation that occurred 
subsequently (or in parallel). In this period the Islamists of Ennahda governed in 
coalition with leftist parties, and struck deals over the constitution and the 
holding of new elections with the main secularist forces of the country. Ennahda 
chose to tone down Islamist ideological claims and appeal to middle class voters 
via their general conservative outlook and ‘good governance’ programme. This 
downgrading of the ideological claims of statist Islamism in a ‘democratizing’ 
institutional context is best illustrated by the agreement reached on the new 
constitution with secularized parties, which resulted in the absence of direct 
references to the sharia in the text of the constitution. By making concessions on 
the constitutional framework and on their utilisation of executive power, 
Ennahda facilitated the acceptance by social and political actors across pre-
existing ideological divides of a democratic model in which most political parties 
estimate that losses today can be compensated by gains in the future.   
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The mainstreaming of Ennahda is also exemplified by the decision of the 
Ennahda-led government to hand over executive power to a technocratic 
government that was more acceptable to the opposition a year ahead of planned 
parliamentary and presidential elections. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, 
Ennahda came in second position, thus illustrating the ‘normality’ of an 
institutionalized Islamist party in a functioning multiparty democracy 
characterized by a rotation of elites. Rather than seeking to have an immediate 
impact on the state institutions and state governance, statist Islamists in Tunisia 
have prioritized becoming an entrenched, mainstream party with a say in public 
and political life regardless of whether they are in opposition or in government. 
From an agent-centric perspective, it could thus be said that the strategies of the 
key actors of the Tunisian transition were conducive to a consolidation of 
democracy. But for Ennahda and it secular rivals to deepen their support bases 
and ward off the threat of ’culture wars’, the daunting task of narrowing 
socioeconomic inequalities must be tackled. In such a case, statist Islamists move 
from purely cultural and moral claims as their main source of legitimation and 
become a party grounded on socio-economic policies that are drafted to appeal 
to a non-ideologically defined electorate.  
 
Non-Statist Islamism and the uprisings 
The post-2011 trajectories of salafis and jihadis in the countries of the Arab 
uprisings are also tied to both the general political evolution of the different 
states, and in particular to the success and failures of their statist Islamist rivals. 
However because jihadi actors do not primarily have a state-centric agenda, 
their local engagement varies according to circumstances, from the 
deterritorialized mode of action of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb30 to the 
centralized control of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  
 Regionally, two main post-uprisings developments strengthened the jihadi 
trend, which was briefly deemed to fall into irrelevance at the time of the 
uprisings. First, the multiplication of civil conflicts and the reduction of state 
capacity (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Yemen) has increased the number of locations 
and of potential recruits for armed jihadism. Jihadi operations moved to those 
areas where armed resistance against the state seemed possible, legitimate and 
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effective. Thus at the beginning of 2012, pre-existing jihadi networks in North 
Africa, particularly AQIM, redirected their efforts southwards towards Mali to 
join the challenge to the Malian state led by returning Tuareg from Libya. In the 
North African context, the dis-organization of the security apparatuses of the old 
authoritarian regimes allowed them to operate more freely.31 Similarly, in Syria, 
al-Qaeda-supported Iraqi networks redeployed themselves on the Syrian 
battlefield to oppose Asad’s government (and more secularized rebel groups) by 
creating the al-Nusra front. 
 In conflict zones like Syria and Iraq, salafis and jihadis are more directly 
creating structures of popular inclusion—albeit on a divisive sectarian basis—as 
the state institutions are unable or unwilling to do so. This is indicative of the 
continued weakness of the state post-uprisings (despite it being ‘hard’ and 
‘fierce’)32 as well as the limited abilities of the statist Islamist parties to 
incorporate mass constituencies in such circumstances. There is evidently a 
causal relation between the ongoing violent confrontation between authoritarian 
state elites and statist Islamists and the reduced ability of both to address 
satisfactorily issues of mass inclusion.  
 When it is in control of territories, jihadism has proven to be an effective, 
and fairly economical, ideological and legal resource for groups seeking to 
enforce obedience and conformity among fragmented or traumatised 
communities, such as in the case of state weakening or collapse. The appeal of 
the jihadi model may relate to its simplicity and the ease by which it may be 
‘rolled out’ in different contexts.33 Even if the leaderships of groups like the 
Islamic State and Ansar al-Sharia (both in its Yemeni and Libyan declinations) 
are not ‘organic’ to the populations they seek to rule, they can garner consent by 
striking deals with (i.e. ‘buying off’) tribal and other local authorities, appealing 
to disaffected Sunni youth and enforcing a recognisable—even if not 
welcomed—legal regime. The case of ISIS illustrates the evolution from infra-
politics to the transnational politics of jihadism when the constraints of state 
control are relaxed. The organization is primarily concerned with, on the one 
hand, the micro-management of societal issues through religious regulations 
and, on the other, sustaining its capabilities to wage transnational warfare 
against opponents of their creed. 
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 The transnational dimension of jihadi activism has also been strengthened 
by a particular regional combination of successes and failures of democratization 
after the Arab uprisings. The failure of democratisation and the failure, apart 
from in Tunisia, of statist Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood “brand,” amidst 
the Syrian conflict and the Egyptian military coup have ensured the continuing 
relevance of a jihadi ideological discourse, which had been threatened when it 
appeared Islamist movements could gain power democratically. In 2014, with 
the rebirth of ISIS and the sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria, the ideological 
attractiveness of jihadi discourses may also have increased.  
The transnational and regional dimension of jihadism in connection with the 
post-Arab uprisings conflict goes well beyond the countries of the Arab uprisings 
themselves. In addition to the circulation of jihadists within the Arab world, 
‘foreign fighters’ are increasingly drawn from Muslim populations based in 
Europe.34 Such dynamics, which are actively promoted by jihadi movements, 
illustrate that they are not solely the product of failures of democratization in the 
Arab world but reflect wider problems of social and political inclusion and 
alienation.  
This means that states not currently in the throes of civil war will not 
necessarily escape jihadist or salafi activism. Across the region the salafi trend 
continues to act as a refuge for political (or armed) activism in the countries of 
the region for different reasons in both democratizing and non-democratizing 
countries. In Egypt the increase in repression and political blockage following 
the military coup has inexorably pushed would-be political activists back into 
either pious withdrawal or, for some, violence. In Tunisia, the rapid rise of Ansar 
al-Sharia in a context where an Islamist-led government was in charge of the 
country illustrated the dissatisfaction of many of the actors of the revolution 
(particularly the unemployed urban youth) with the slow pace of change and the 
pragmatic political approach taken by Ennahda. Thus, even in a context of 
strengthening and democratizing state institutions –that is in ‘successful’ 
democratic transitions– the uneasy process of turning revolutionary citizens into 
‘well-behaved’ voters ensures that those constituencies that still feel excluded 
and/or unhappy from the dominant political consensus can find alternative 
avenues of inclusion via non-statist Islamist movements.  
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Conclusion 
The different embodiments of Islamism in the region, their successes and their 
failures, track the rise and fall of different models of governance far more than 
they follow the fate of particular regimes. It is the degree and nature of 
transformation in state-society relations, through the formal and practical 
positioning of Islamist parties that directly influence the evolution of post-
uprisings Islamism. As O’Donnell and Schmitter already noted regarding the 
democratic transitions of the 1980s, the plasticity of identities is a crucial 
component of the political process during such transitional periods.35 Because of 
historical trajectories, some Islamists movements faced a more arduous task 
than others in reinventing themselves and in contributing to an overall 
transformation of the political ethos in the post-uprisings situations. Thus 
Ennahda in Tunisia, with its well-considered reformist approach, its non-
conflictual relations with a weakly politicized military, and organizational 
superiority over an emerging salafi movement was better placed than the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (or in heavily militarized and fragmented Libya 
and Yemen). This does not necessarily mean that the former was bound to 
succeed and the latter bound to fail, but rather that the strategies devised by 
each actor were crucial in tipping their countries towards or away from 
democratic consolidation. When, as in Tunisia, Islamist parties participate in a 
working multiparty system, accompanied by an increase in civil liberties, they 
can contribute to democratic consolidation, stability and enhanced state 
governance. Where Islamist movements are violently excluded, as in Egypt after 
the 2013 military coup and the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposite 
results.  
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